Category Archives: North Hatley Communications

Presentation by Michael Grayson, eng., to the MRC de Memphrémagog, April 13, 2017.

Memoir submitted to MRC Memphrémagog during the period of Public Consultation on the MRC’s Management Plan (Plan de gestion) for a part of North Hatley’s flood zone

Good evening

I thank the Prefect for allowing me extra time to make my presentation. I am Michael Grayson, a civil engineer and environmentalist, and I’ve lived in North Hatley since 2002.

I’ll begin by showing you blown-up portions of two maps, each of which set out to show flood zones as they apply to the study zone: the proposed development site. The two maps paint very different portraits of the same subject.

  1. The first map was produced in late 2012 for the municipality by land surveyors Ouellet, Couture (Ecce Terra) and signed February, 2013. See Map #1 in Appendix 1

The Town asked them to make a topographical map covering all flood zones in North Hatley, and to trace on that map the contours corresponding to 20 and 100 year flood levels of the lake. These levels (162.16 and 162.56 m above sea-level) are obtained statistically from data provided by the Environment Ministry.

(In my presentation, I shall use this shortened title for the Ministry of Sustainable Development, Environment and Action against Climate Change).

  1. The second map, produced by consulting firm EXP, was delivered to the Town a few months later. It is the map adopted in 2015 as the MRC’s revised flood zone map for North Hatley : Map #A2-7a. See Map #2

It is the product of a simulation of the river’s profile corresponding to different periods of flood recurrence. It assumes that water levels in the study zone are directly related to river levels in all flood events.

Areas shaded in red show the extent of flooding, due to a 20 year event. In a 100 year event, water will in addition cover the areas shown in yellow.

Comparison of the two maps reveals striking differences: far more terrain is flooded according to the first map. How can these differences be explained?

Two factors are largely responsible.

  • The first results from two different ways of interpreting the cause of flooding in the study zone.
  • In their 2013 analysis, EXP sees the river as the sole cause of all flood events affecting this land.

It is paradoxical that EXP states in their report that “Land bordering the river (Riverside Park) is higher than the development zone, and therefore in theory should prevent flood waters reaching the zone”. They nonetheless produce a map showing extensive flooding in this zone.

  • The surveyors’ map shows the situation when the lake overflows directly onto the development zone. It relates flood events directly to the lake.

The river mouth’s capacity is limited by the presence of the road-bridge and the narrow section between the Pilsen Pub on one bank and the stone retaining wall on the other. In major flood events, lake water is forced to rise until it spills over at Dreamland Park.

I’ll come back to this a little later.

  • The other factor behind this major difference is incorrect measurements taken in 2013 of the road-bridge at the river mouth.

In responding to my allegation of the error in January 2015 (Public consultation), EXP continued to maintain that the underside of the bridge was 63 cm lower than reality.

This error amplified the strangling effect of the bridge on river flow. The Ministry of Environment has recently acknowledged the need to review the effect of this error on the analysis leading to the flood zone map.

It is interesting to note how closely the first map corresponds to the flood zone map for North Hatley that was in force, until the revised map replaced it in 2015.

We should now return to the two different systems which can cause the zone to flood:

  • The river in the case of more frequent events (of less severity).
  • The lake in high-water events when the river capacity cannot meet the demand.
  • Up to the point when the lake’s level reaches that of Main Street at its lowest point (at the intersection with Capelton Road), the river can be seen as the principal cause of flooding in this zone.

Kezar Stream also contributes some water.

  • But, when the lake level rises above that of the road, water starts to flow directly towards the site without passing through the river. The lake becomes the controlling factor for flood levels in the zone.

This kind of event can be predicted to have a recurrence rate of about 25 years, using data from the Environment Ministry.

  • The last flooding in this zone coming directly from the lake occurred in 1994.

The next one can be anticipated in the near future. These events usually occur in mid-late April.

The lake level rose to 162.40 m in 1994, as confirmed by EXP, and water was level with the underside of the bridge. See Figure 1 in Appendix 2

At this time, water was crossing Main Street at a depth of 15 – 20 cm. See Figure 2

  • In a 100 year event, water crossing the road would be 30 – 35 cm deep.

Depths in the flood zone would be considerably greater due to lower level of the proposed building site.

  • Photos of past flood events show turbulent water crossing the road and flowing toward the study zone. Analysis of these photos point to water speeds of at least 10 kmh.
  • In 2014, rising waters caused the municipality to place sand-bags along the edge of Main Street at Dreamland Park.

It would be totally unrealistic to think that such a measure could be effective in a higher water event.

  • In view of the probable occurrence of more extreme weather events related to climate change, lake levels could reach the road level more frequently, perhaps on a 20 year level of probability.

I would like to emphasise the extent to which the land surveyors’ map represents the reality as observed on this piece of land and on adjacent areas.

  • Residents on the east side of Capelton Road testify to the accuracy of flood contours traced by Ecce Terra.
  • Photos of the 1994 flood show gas pumps behind the accommodation store (dépanneur) surrounded by 30 – 40 cm of water, which corresponds to what Ecce Terra’s map shows.See Figure 3 in Appendix 2.

In contrast, this area should never flood, according to the MRC’s map, even during 100 year events.

According to the surveyors’ map, water depths will reach 80 – 90 cm around blocks M1 and M2 during 20 – 25 year events, and up to 125 cm in 100 year events.

See Map #3 for the proposed location of residential blocks in the flood zone.

These depths are 50 to 60 cm greater than those indicated in the study leading to the MRC’s map. These differences correspond perfectly with the error made in measuring the vertical clearance of the bridge.

When the lake is seen as the direct cause of serious floods on the site, Table 3 on page 25 of the Plan de gestion loses its credibility. It shows 46% of sector M1 and 39% of sector M2 as being in a high current flood zone (0 – 20 years). In reality, M1 would be entirely in the 20 year zone and M2 almost entirely.

As for the proposed mixed commercial and residential sector C1, at least half of this area is within a high current flood zone, and the remainder in a low current zone (20 – 100 years). Water will reach depths of 40 – 50 cm in 20 year events and close to one metre in 100 year events.

(This is in sharp contrast to the MRC’s assertion that this is at all times a dry zone).

Role of the study zone

I’d like to briefly refer to the important role which this low-lying corridor has played, from time to time over recent decades, as an overflow channel for the lake. It was formerly part of a wider wetland at the toe of the lake, between Capelton Road and the river. Figure 4 shows how floods covered this whole area, until landfill (including town waste) raised the land east of the railway to create what is now Riverside Park.  This forced flood water into a narrower channel through the study zone, before it can return to the wider stretch of river beyond the park.

The lowest part of the study zone should not be obstructed. It must continue to act as a sort of spillway for the lake, just as it did until 2002. It was then that the municipality blocked this channel by constructing the east-west arm of the parking area, without the requisite authorisation of the Environment Ministry. There has not been a major flood event since 1994 … the next one is likely to happen in the near future.

The relocation and opening up of the Kezar Stream, as required by the Ministry, will necessitate making a passage through this “dam”, which will permit the free flow of floodwater to occur during future high-water events.

Conclusion

All the foregoing factors lead me to question the pertinence of today’s meeting to discuss a plan which is incomplete and seriously flawed.  I must also wonder about the lack of rigour with which government departments appear to have treated this dossier.

Even supposing that the MRC’s map is valid, I’m amazed at the effort being made to justify construction in these high current flood areas. Why should we run these kinds of risk to build on land where permits have been refused for many years?

When the necessary corrections are made to the flood zone map, then construction as proposed should become unthinkable.

Michael Grayson, eng.

April 13, 2017

APPENDIX 1 : Maps #1 – 3

Map #1: Extract from topographical map, by Ecce Terra land-surveyors

Produced for the municipality of North HatleyFebruary 2013

Map #2: Extract from the Map A2-7a, Schéma d’aménagement, MRC Memphrémagog

Produced by Les Services EXP for the municipality of North Hatley   June 2013

Map #3: Proposed building plan in the flood zone

M1, M2 and R1 offer a total of 210 residential units (condos)

M2 : 5 floors M1 and R1 : 4 floors

This corridor acts as an overflow channel for the lake, during events where lake levels rise above the road-level. Progressive filling of the eastern part of this large former wetland area has forced flood waters to flow with greater force through the study zone, during such high water events. The blue arrow indicates schematically the path which water follows before returning to the river where it widens.

APPENDIX 2 : Figures 1 – 4

FIGURE 1: Water touching the underside of the road-bridge   April 18, 1994.

The bridge was closed to traffic as a precaution.

FIGURE 2: Intersection of Capelton and Main April 17, 1994.

Water flowing across the road, and then flowing through the study zone.

FIGURE 3: Gas pumps behind the accommodation store April 17, 1994

FIGURE 4: Flood event during the 1930s

Looking northwards, with the proposed building site on the left side of the former railway. Filling of the area to the right, now Riverside Park, means that flood-water will periodically flow with greater force through the low-lying land which is slated for development.

The opinions expressed on this website are those of their authors. Space on the website is provided as a service to the community and FANHCA, its administrators and host cannot be held responsible for any of the opinions expressed thereon.

Mémoire de Paul St-Pierre à la MRC de Memphrémagog, le 13 avril, 2017.

NH_FLOOD_sm

[Ci-haut : l’emplacement du bâtiment ‘Chez Dame Jacqueline’]

(English follows)

Consultation publique de la MRC de Memphrémagog du 13 avril 2017: Plan de gestion de la zone inondable de North Hatley

La consultation publique à laquelle nous participons ce soir est prématurée, du fait que le document sur lequel elle porte est incomplet, imparfait, parfois inconsistant, flou et tendancieux.

1. Le document est incomplet : Ce document, à quelques détails près, est celui que le Ministère des affaires municipales a déclaré non conforme aux orientations gouvernementales. Pour le rendre conforme, le village de North Hatley doit déposer auprès du Ministère de l’Environnement une demande de certificat d’autorisation donnant le tracé de la décanalisation du ruisseau Kezar. Or, cette demande n’a pas encore été déposée ; le public ne sait donc pas par où passera le ruisseau Kezar ni comment les différentes propriétés de la zone inondable – tant celles du promoteur que les propriétés avoisinantes – seront affectées. Cela a une importance capitale pour la compréhension du Plan de gestion, du fait que la décanalisation fera en sorte qu’environ 2000 m2 de la zone inondable ne sera plus constructible. Cela risque de rendre impossible la construction d’un des bâtiments figurant dans le Plan de gestion. Sans connaître le tracé effectif du ruisseau décanalisé, il est impossible pour le public de donner un avis éclairé sur le Plan de gestion.

2. Le document est imparfait : D’autres l’ont souligné, les calculs eu égard la délimitation des zones d’inondation 0-20, et 20-100 ans doivent être refaits, et cela pour plusieurs raisons – 1. La hauteur attribuée au pont dans le document EXP ne correspond pas aux mesures figurant dans les données du Ministère des transports, ce qui a vraisemblablement un effet sur le calcul des niveaux d’eau. L’effet de cette erreur de calcul de la part d’EXP aurait dû être vérifié avant de consulter le public sur le document ; 2. La délimitation des zones d’inondation dans le document EXP ne correspond pas à la réalité vécue des résidents de la zone ; 3. Le Plan de gestion ne tient pas compte du niveau de l’eau quand la zone est inondée directement du lac, comme en 1994 et dans les années 1920. Ne pas en tenir compte, c’est mettre en péril inutilement les résidents de la zone inondable et leurs biens.

D’autres erreurs dans le document sont reliées à la Politique de protection des rives, du littoral et des plaines inondables. L’article 5.3 établit les critères spécifiques d’acceptabilité d’un plan, notamment en ce qui concerne l’éligibilité d’une zone et le contenu du plan. Malgré ce qui est affirmé dans le document faisant l’objet de la consultation publique ce soir, la zone inondable de North Hatley ne rencontre pas l’exigence d’ « une densité nette plus grande que 5,0 constructions à l’hectare ». Les chiffres donnés dans le Tableau 2 à la page 11 du document sont inexacts, du fait qu’y sont inclues des constructions autres que des constructions principales. Par ailleurs, l’article 5.3 mentionne aussi que « le plan de gestion doit établir un calendrier de mise en œuvre [Je souligne] » ; or, le document ne présente pas de calendrier, mais simplement une liste de tâches à accomplir. Enfin, l’article 5.3 note que « le plan de gestion doit tenir compte des titres de propriété de l’État …  [Je souligne]. » Aucune mention n’est faite, cependant, des servitudes municipales qui existent dans la zone, autres que celles liées aux systèmes d’aqueduc et d’égout – telle, par exemple, celle entre l’Église Inter-foi et l’ancien parc Emily LeBaron. Le document devrait être refait pour rencontrer ces différentes exigences de l’article 5.3 de la Politique de protection.

3. Le document est parfois inconsistant : Deux études sont citées en annexe au Plan de gestion ; elles en constituent le fondement même de son analyse du site. Or, ce deux études parfois se contredisent. Ainsi, l’étude Avizo indique que le terrain du bâtiment connu au village sous le nom de « Chez Dame Jacqueline » (numéro de référence 26) se situe à la fois en dehors de la zone inondable, dans la zone 0-20 ans, et dans la zone 20-100 ans. Des photos confirment, par ailleurs, que le bâtiment a été entouré dans le passé par l’eau venant directement du lac lors d’une inondation. [Voir ci-dessous] Par contre, l’étude EXP place le bâtiment totalement en dehors de la zone inondable. Cette contradiction – et il en existe peut-être d’autres – ne fait que confirmer que les données figurant dans l’étude EXP doivent nécessairement être recalculées avant l’approbation du Plan de gestion ; en fait, elles auraient dû l’être avant de procéder à la consultation publique sur le document.

4. Le document est flou : 1. Aux pages 22 et 23 du Plan de gestion, les nouvelles constructions autorisées sont présentées en termes d’ ‘étages’ (trois étages, quatre étages, cinq étages). Or, la notion d’ ‘étage’ est par sa nature même imprécise et ne correspond pas à la réglementation actuellement en vigueur au village, qui mesure la hauteur des bâtiments en ‘mètres’ ; 2. À la page 27 du Plan de gestion on peut lire, en rapport avec la décanalisation du ruisseau Kezar, qu’ « [u]ne bande d’une largeur de 10 m sera revégétalisée » ; en fait, la largeur de la bande devra être de 10 mètres de chaque côté du ruisseau – une bande d’une largeur supérieure à 20 mètres, donc.

5. Le document est tendancieux : Un plan de gestion constitue un document cadre et est intégré au Schéma d’aménagement. Le schéma d’aménagement est « un document de planification chargé d’énoncer les grandes orientations et grandes affectations de la politique générale de la MRC quant à l’aménagement de son territoire. » (Marc-André LeChasseur, Zonage et urbanisme en droit municipal québécois, p. 255. Je souligne.) Or, ce que présente le Plan de gestion de la zone inondable de North Hatley résulte directement d’une entente de principe particulière entre la municipalité et un promoteur, propriétaire de la quasi-totalité des terrains figurant dans la zone d’inondation. Pour s’en convaincre, il suffit de comparer l’entente de principe et le Plan de gestion en ce qui concerne le nombre et la hauteur des bâtiments envisagés, le nombre d’unités de logement, ainsi que l’occupation au sol proposée. C’est dire que le Plan de gestion n’a pas été élaboré en fonction de besoins généraux ou de grandes orientations ; il ne constitue pas un cadre général pour le développement du village. Le Plan de gestion présenté ici a été élaboré en fonction d’un développement précis et d’un promoteur particulier. Or, qu’est-ce qui arrive si ce projet ne se réalise pas et un tout autre projet est présenté, éventuellement par un autre promoteur (des maisons de ville, par exemple) ? Puisque le Plan de gestion a été élaboré en fonction d’un projet particulier, dont les détails sont donnés dans le document, est-ce que cela veut dire que seul ce projet serait possible en vertu du Plan de gestion proposé ?

Les directives du Ministère des affaires municipales en matière de consultation publique sont claires – les documents soumis au public doivent être fiables. Or, le Plan de gestion discuté ce soir ne constitue pas un document fiable ; la consultation publique est prématurée.

C’est pour cette raison que je demande que l’on suspende la consultation publique pour la reprendre une fois le Plan de gestion complété et corrigé.

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Presentation by Paul St-Pierre to the MRC de Memphrémagog, April 13, 2017.

NH_FLOOD_sm

(Above: location of the building ‘Chez Dame Jacqueline’)

Public consultation by the MRC de Memphrémagog, April 13, 2017: Management plan for the North Hatley flood zone.

The public consultation we are taking part in tonight is premature, since the document on which it is based is incomplete, flawed, at times inconsistent, vague, and tendentious.

1. The document is incomplete: This document, other than in a few details, is the same as the one the Ministry of Municipal Affairs declared not in compliance with government guidelines. To make it compliant, the Village of North Hatley must file with the Ministry of the Environment an application for a certificate of authorization setting out the course of Kezar stream. This application has not yet been filed; the public does not know where Kezar stream will go or how the various properties in the flood zone – both those of the promoter and the surrounding properties – will be affected. This is of crucial importance for an understanding of the Management Plan, as the decanalization of Kezar stream will render approximately 2,000 m2 of land in the flood zone unbuildable. This may make it impossible for one of the buildings listed in the Management Plan to be built. Without knowing the actual course of the decanalized stream, it is impossible for the public to give an informed opinion on the Management Plan.

2. The document is flawed: Others have pointed out that the calculations with regard to the delineation of the 0-20 and 20-100 year flood zones have to be redone, for several reasons: 1. The height assigned to the bridge in the EXP document does not correspond to the measurements by the Ministry of Transport, and this is likely to affect the calculation of water levels. The actual effect of this error in the EXP document should have been calculated before holding a public consultation on the document; 2. The delineation of the flood zones in the EXP document does not correspond to what the residents of the area actually experience; 3. The Management Plan does not take into account water levels when the area is flooded directly from the lake, as in 1994 and in the 1920s. Failure to do this means that residents of the flood zone and their property are being unnecessarily put at risk.

Other important flaws in the document relate to the Protection Policy for Lakeshores, Riverbanks, Littoral Zones and Floodplains.  Article 5.3 sets out criteria for the eligibility of zones for a Management Plan, as well as what the Plan must contain. Despite what is claimed in the document under discussion, the floodplain in North Hatley does not meet the density requirement under article 5.3 of more than five (5) principal constructions per hectare. The figures given in Table 2 (page 11) of the document are incorrect, since they include constructions other than principal constructions in the calculation. In addition, whereas Article 5.3 also indicates that “the management plan must stipulate an implementation schedule (‘calendrier de mise œuvre,’ in the French version. My emphasis),” the document presents no such ‘schedule’ but rather simply a series of tasks to be completed at an indefinite point of time in the future. Finally, Article 5.3. also notes that “the management plan must take into account titles of ownership of the State … .” (My emphahsis) There is, however, no mention made in the document of existing Municipal servitudes in the area, such as that between the Église Inter-foi and the former Emily LeBaron Park. The document needs to be reworked so that it meets the requirements of article 5.3 of the Protection Policy.

3. The document is at times inconsistent: Two studies are cited in the Annex to the Management Plan; they constitute the very basis of its analysis of the site. At times, however, they contradict each other. The Avizo study indicates that parts of the site of the building known in the village under the name of “Chez Dame Jacqueline” (Avizo study: reference number 26) are located variously outside the flood zone, within the 0-20 year zone, and in the 20-100 year zone. Photos confirm that the building has in the past been completely surrounded during flooding by water coming directly from the lake. [See below] The EXP study, however, places the site of the building completely outside the flood zone. This contradiction – and there may be others – only serves to confirm that the data in the EXP study needs to be recalculated prior to approval of the Management Plan; in fact, the data should have been recalculated prior to the public consultation on the document.

4. The document is vague: 1. On pages 22 and 23 of the Management Plan, the newly constructed buildings are presented in terms of ‘floors’ (three floors, four floors, five floors). The concept of ‘floor’ is by its very nature imprecise and does not correspond to the regulations currently in force in the village, which measure the height of buildings in ‘meters’; 2. On page 27 of the Management Plan, it is noted in relation to the decanalisation of Kezar stream, that “[u]ne bande d’une largeur de 10 m sera revégétalisée.” In fact, the width of the strip to be replanted and left unbuilt will be 10 meters on each side of the stream – thus, a band wider than 20 meters.

5. The document is tendentious: A management plan is a document that serves as a framework and is integrated into the Schéma d’aménagement. The Schéma d’aménagement is “un document de planification chargé d’énoncer les grandes orientations et grandes affectations de la politique générale de la MRC quant à l’aménagement de son territoire” (Marc-André LeChasseur, Zonage et urbanisme en droit municipal québécois, page 255. My emphasis.) What is presented in the North Hatley Floodplain Management Plan is linked directly to a particular agreement in principle between the municipality and a developer, the owner of most of the land in the flood zone. To be convinced of this direct link, one need only compare the agreement in principle and the Management Plan with regard to the number and the height of the buildings envisaged, the number of units, as well as the proposed footprint. This means that the Management Plan has not been developed according to general needs or broad guidelines; it does not constitute a general framework for the development of the village. What will happen if this project is not carried out and another project is presented, perhaps by another promoter (townhouses, for example)? Since the Management Plan has been developed on the basis of a particular project, the specific details of which determine the content of the document, does this mean that only this project would be possible under the proposed Management Plan?

The Ministry of Municipal Affairs’ guidelines for public consultations are clear – the documents submitted to the public must be reliable. The Management Plan discussed this evening is not a reliable document; the public consultation is premature.

This is why I am calling for the public consultation to be suspended and resumed once the Management Plan has been completed and corrected.

The opinions expressed on this website are those of their authors. Space on the website is provided as a service to the community and FANHCA, its administrators and host cannot be held responsible for any of the opinions expressed thereon.